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In a recent paper Horsten embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain
of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori
knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability
that is not relativized to a formal system. He presented an argument for the
conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number
of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property.
Informally glossed, Horsten’s argument runs as follows:
[1] Suppose, for a reductio, that there exists a property θ of natural num-
bers such that it is provable that for some natural number n, θ (n) is true
but unprovable. [2] Then, by the least number principle, there must be
a smallest such natural number n. [3] Then there provably exists exactly
one smallest number n such that θ (n) is true but unprovable. [4] Then it
is provable that the smallest n such that θ (n) is true but unprovable is
true but unprovable. [5] But then θ (n) is both provable and unprovable.
[6] But this is a contradiction. So there can be no property of natural
numbers θ (n) such that it is provable that for some number n, θ (n) is
true but unprovable. [(?, p. 1); the numbering is mine]
It is crucial for the argument to work that the following description principle is
correct:
If it is provable that a given property φ (x) stated in the language of
arithmetic plus the concept of knowability is uniquely satisfied, then there
is a description term ιxφ (x) (‘the φ’) such that φ (ιxφ (x)) holds. (?, p.
241)
Because his argument essentially involves the above description principle, Horsten
calls his argument the description argument. In what follows I will use the above
description principle in an argument for the collapse of provability into truth
– a collapse argument, in short. The collapse argument consists of two main
steps.
First, I will prove that, for every φ, there is a unique number n that satisfies
the following property:
n equals 1 iff φ is true and n equals 0 iff φ is false and it is provable
that n equals 1 or it is provable that n equals 0
Call this property ‘φ∗’. Suppose that φ is true. Then if one replaces n with 1,
then one gets a theorem, φ∗ (1). Suppose that φ is false. Then if one replaces
1
n with 0, then one gets a theorem, φ∗ (0). Either φ is true, or it is not. So
either φ∗ (1) is true, or φ∗ (0) is. By existential generalisation on both disjuncts,
there is a natural number n, such that φ∗ (n), or there is a natural number n,
such that φ∗ (n). Either way, there is a natural number n, such that φ∗ (n).
It remains to be established that n is unique. Suppose it is not. Then there
is another natural number m, such that φ∗ (m), and m differs from n. Now
suppose that φ is true. Then both n and m equal 1 and, therefore, by the
transitivity of identity, n equals m. Contradiction. Similarly in the case that φ
is false. To conclude, there is a unique natural number n, such that φ∗ (n).
Second, the above fact leads, in combination with the description princi-
ple, to the conclusion that provability collapses into truth. By the closure of
provability under theoremhood, it is provable that it is provable that there is a
unique natural number n, such that φ∗ (n). It follows by the description prin-
ciple and the closure of provability under theoremhood and modus ponens that
it is provable that:
ιxφ∗ (x) equals 1 iff φ is true and ιxφ∗ (x) equals 0 iff φ is false and
it is provable that ιxφ∗ (x) equals 1 or it is provable that ιxφ∗ (x)
equals 0
Then it follows by the closure of provability under modus ponens and the fac-
tivity of provability that:
it is provable that ιxφ∗ (x) equals 1 iff it is provable that φ is true
and it is provable that ιxφ∗ (x) equals 0 iff it is provable that φ is
false and it is provable that ιxφ∗ (x) equals 1 or it is provable that
ιxφ∗ (x) equals 0
It is a tautological consequence that is is either provable that φ is true, or it
is provable that φ is false. Suppose that φ is true. Then, by the factivity of
provability, it is not the case that it is provable that φ is false. Hence, it is
provable that φ is true. This concludes the collapse argument.
The collapse argument ought to be accepted by anyone who accepts the
description argument. Horsten is committed to a certain theory, call it Horsten’s
theory, of which all principles are: (a) either explicitly or implicitly used in
the description argument, or (b) are sound on his informal interpretation of
the vocabulary. I leave it to the reader to verify this claim. Moreover, the
conclusion of the collapse argument is relevant for anyone who wants to evaluate
the description argument. Let me explain this briefly.
Opinion is divided over the question whether all arithmetical truths are
provable or not. Whoever thinks that all arithmetical truths are ultimately
provable must accept the description principle if one is willing to allow descrip-
tion terms, for it is simply a theorem of any reasonable first-order logic with
description terms. However, the conclusion of the description argument be-
comes trivial. Indeed, it says nothing more then that there is no property φ
and natural number n such that it both true and false that φ (n). On the other
hand, those who accept that there are unprovable arithmetical truths have to
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reject the conclusion of the collapse argument and, therefore, at least one of its
assumptions. To sum up, either all arithmetical truth are provable, or they are
not. It follows that either the description argument is sound but its conclusion
is trivial, or the description argument is unsound.1
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